OVERVIEW

42. For almost fifty years, a number of countries have been developing nuclear technology, both in the civil and weapons' industries. Large-scale national nuclear construction programmess did not truly flourish until the early 1960s, and for the most part came to an end by the 1980s. Despite the short tenure of this "nuclear golden age" the industry has left a long term lethal legacy -- massive quantities of radioactive waste representing a threat for the environment and health of present and future generations.

43. The European Commission has estimated that seven nuclear nations in the European Community will have produced the following amounts of radioactive waste by the year 2,000:

Low and medium radioactive wastes:

Arisings prior to 1986, now stored: 59,000 cubic meters

Projected quantity, 1986-2000: 1,150,000 cubic meters

Alpha and high level radioactive wastes:

Arisings prior to 1986, now stored: 62,000 cubic meters

Projected quantity: 62,000 cubic meters

44. In the U:.S.A., and only considering civil nuclear sources, the total accumulated amount of low level radioactive wastes is 21,300 metric tonnes, and of irradiated spent fuel, 700,100 cubic meters.

45. These figures fail to include the waste expected from the decommissioning of nuclear reactors. In fact, and despite a cessation in the expansion of the nuclear industry, the demand for radioactive waste disposal options has increased due to the waste from the decommissioning of a growing number of reactors. In the early planning stages of nuclear programmes, very little attention was given to the problem of decommissioning, and there is a serious lack of technology and resources to deal with the vast quantities of wastes that will be produced.

46. The option of dumping radioactive wastes in shallow land- fills has now been rejected for national sites by many States on environmental and health grounds, and at present, there exists no operating facility anywhere in the world for the disposal of high level radioactive wastes. Wherever attempts have been made to conduct development work for such facilities, those countries have discovered that their own citizens have rejected them. In countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France and the U.S.S.R., local communities have vigorously resisted the siting of high-level radioactive waste disposal facilities in their region.

47. The dumping of radioactive wastes at sea was carried out for many years by the U.S.A. and some European countries. In 1983 the contracting parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (London Dumping Convention or LDC) agreed, after long debate and controversy, on a moratorium on the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea. Since then, no ocean dumping operation of nuclear waste is known to have occurred.

48. The LDC's moratorium was adopted out of grave concern for the state of the ocean environment, and for the health and economic well-being of the communities whose livelihoods depend upon marine produce. A cheap and effective means to off-load domestic problems onto the global community was thereby denied to those countries producing large quantities of radioactive wastes.

49. The report of the LDC 's Inter-governmental Panel on Radio Active Disposal (IGPRAD) is likely to be released in 1992. In light of this report, the LDC Contracting Parties will have to decide whether to allow sea dumping of radioactive wastes to resume, to continue moratorium, or to ban permanently the practice by amending the Annexes to the Convention. Because of existing scientific uncertainties, and differing management philosophies, no consensus is expected, despite of over ten years of active debate. Very strong pressure is to be expected from some countries and from the nuclear industry itself, to re-open the sea dumping option. In the 1990s and beyond, the nuclear industry will be faced with ever increasing amounts of radioactive wastes, both in volume and in terms of the radioactivity involved, as a result of the massive decommissioning programmes of the old and now contaminated nuclear plants, and with waste management problems of unprecedented magnitude, for which there is no true solution to date.

50. The central theme of all radioactive waste issues is that, no matter how sophisticated the technology employed, the risk presented to health and environment cannot be reduced to zero. And in fact the risks are considerable. The countries who have "benefited" from nuclear energy must not attempt to pass the huge environmental, social and political cost of these wastes to the global commons or to other States. It is perfectly legitimate for all people in all countries to reject exposure to the long-term risk presented by radioactive wastes.

EXPORTING THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROBLEM

51. The two favoured options for dealing with radioactive wastes, dumping on national territory, or dumping in the "global commons" of the oceans, present technical, political and legal problems. Faced with an imminent increase in the quantities of radioactive waste that must be managed, the "nuclear countries" and industry are now seeking another option for the disposal of this extremely hazardous waste: export for disposal in other countries.

52. Despite strenuous efforts, attempts to codify concerns over the transboundary movements of radioactive wastes within global fora have met with little success. The recently concluded Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (Basel 1989) actually sought to exclude radioactive wastes.

53. From the preparatory documentation of the Basel Convention, it is clear that the decision to exclude radioactive wastes was taken on the mistaken assumption that "control systems" had already been established for the regulation of trade in radioactive wastes, and that these "control systems" fall under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, and contrary to information provided by the IAEA to UNEP during the Basel negotiations, legally binding "control systems" for the regulation of transboundary movements of radioactive waste did not exist at that time, nor to this day.

54. The frequently cited "Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste", which was only recently adopted by the IAEA General Conference of September 1990, does not in any way prohibit the transboundary movement of radioactive wastes, nor is it binding in its "control" as the Basel Convention will be once it is in force. Rather, this non-binding code only provides the guidelines to States for the development of policies and law on the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste, based mainly in the "prior notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit States".

55. The same code recognizes that "it is the sovereign right of every state to prohibit the movement of radioactive wastes into, from, or through its territory". Greenpeace believes that only a complete ban on radioactive waste import into the Caribbean region will prevent the dangers inherent to radioactive wastes.

56. The recent signatories to the Lomé IV Convention recognized the futility of attempting to "control" or manage such transport and called for a complete ban on the import of radioactive wastes into the 68 ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) group of States as part of its waste trade ban (Article 39). (See Section on Lomé IV Convention below).

SUB-SEABED DISPOSAL IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION

57. One of the options that has been considered to deal with radioactive wastes is sub-seabed disposal--the implantation of wastes into the ocean floor. Member-nations of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD have devoted resources estimated to several hundreds of millions of dollars to research and development of the sub-seabed disposal option for high-level radioactive wastes. This research effort has been coordinated by the NEA's so-called Seabed Working Group (SWG) formed in 1975 by the U.S.A., U.K., EEC, France, Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Federal Republic of Germany, and observers from Belgium and Italy.

58. Separately, the US has also carried out its own research programme, through the U.S. Sub-seabed Disposal Programme, a facet of the U.S. National Waste Terminal Storage Programme, started in 1973. U.S. funding was pared in 1984/85, but was later resurrected with the formation in 1987 of a "US Sub-seabed Consortium" formed by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and six other academic institutions, with a budget of 250 millions of US dollars. The present status of the Consortium and US sub-seabed research is unclear at present, but sub-seabed disposal is still considered an option for HLW by the Department of Energy in the USA.

59. The NEA Seabed Working Group (SWG) published its report in December 1988. Although it points out many scientific and technical uncertainties, the report concludes that sub-seabed disposal is a feasible option for the disposal of high-level waste, and advocates a continuation of the research program. It is important to stress that one of the areas of reference considered to implement this disposal method is located within the Wider Caribbean region: the Southern Nares Abyssal Plain at 22.0-24.0 degrees N & 62.0-67.0 degrees W. See Figure 1.

60. Because of the objections to sub-seabed disposal raised within the London Dumping Convention, and the moratorium on radioactive waste dumping, the NEA has officially reduced its sub-seabed research effort, and is dedicating more effort to deep geological disposal on land. However recent developments demonstrate that sub-seabed disposal for radioactive wastes remains an option seriously considered:

i. In 1989 at least two countries, France and Japan, undertook research cruises in the Atlantic;

ii. There is still a strong academic and industrial lobby in the U.S.A. and Europe to intensify sub-seabed disposal research. In Europe some industrial concerns are lobbying so that sub-seabed research enters its next phase, with emplacement tests utilizing torpedo-shaped canisters containing heat-generating (non-radioactive) simulators;

61. As land-based radioactive waste disposal is fraught with difficulties and political turmoil, it is feared that after having been refused from all or most of the possible land-based disposal sites, the nuclear industry will renew its effort to re-open the sea dumping and sub-seabed emplacement options.

62. The impact of sub-seabed disposal of radioactive wastes for the Caribbean region is obvious. There is no evidence whatsoever that this technology would isolate the radioactive wastes from the biosphere. It would damage the tourist and fishing industries among others, as the contamination of the environment, as well as the dangers inherent in the sea transport of radioactive wastes would represent an unacceptable threat against the livelihood and well-being of the region's inhabitants.

63. Attention must be given to the fact that in 1989, the five member States of the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific (CPPS) adopted a Protocol against Radioactive Pollution which bans the dumping and sub-seabed burial of radioactive wastes in their respective Exclusive Economic Zones. Other regional agreements in other parts of the world, such as the Rarotonga Treaty (1985) in the South Pacific, also ban the dumping at sea of radioactive wastes. It is nowadays more and more recognized that - whenever possible and appropriate - regional treaties should go beyond any existing global mechanism, in order to reflect adequately the necessarily higher number of common denominators amongst the Parties to a regional agreement, and - at the same time - encourage the improvement of global treaties. Within this context, and in light of the specific relevance of the issue for the Wider Caribbean region - it is desirable that the Parties to the Cartagena Convention take the appropriate steps to prevent and ban the dumping and sub-seabed disposal of radioactive wastes in the region. By doing so, not only would they eliminate an environmental and social threat to the region, they also would send to the world a strong message in favour of more stringent ocean protection regimes.

THE TRANSIT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN

64. Spent fuel from commercial Japanese nuclear power reactors is transported through the Panama canal, in order to reach the Sellafield (U.K.) and La Hague (France) reprocessing plants. Once through the Panama canal the ships are likely to take the Mona Passage which lies between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. The alternative course through the Caribbean would be the Windward Passage which lies between Cuba and Haiti. See Figure 2.

65. There are currently five especially designed ships involved in the transport of irradiated fuel. The registered owner of those ships is Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) of the United Kingdom. Each of the ships is capable of transporting some 90,000 kg. of nuclear spent fuel distributed in 20-24 casks. In 1989, PNTL ships carried ten loads of spent fuel through the Panama canal.

66. There are considerable risks involved in the sea transport of this radioactive material. Shipping fires, grounding, foundering and subsequent sinking are a fact of life in maritime transport and nuclear shipments will inevitably fall victim to these same odds. The nuclear industry suggests that the chances of a major disaster are decreased by building strong casks, and by using special ships for the carriage of nuclear spent fuel. But ultimately these measures are recognized as limiting rather than prohibiting accidents. The question is not whether accidents may happen but what would be the consequences of such accidents.

67. Primarily the nuclear industry says that its casks will protect radioactive cargoes in case of accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency has promulgated a series of guidelines for the development and production of casks. Unfortunately, these guidelines are neither stringent enough nor do they take into account the real dynamics of shipping accidents.

68. For instance, studies indicate that these containers can lose their integrity after a fire of only 1 hour. This figure is based on a fire generating a temperature of 800 degrees Celsius, or 1,475 degrees Fahrenheit. On the other hand, shipboard fires, on average, burn for over 20 hours, and can generate temperatures of 2,400 degrees Fahrenheit.

69. The industry is of course aware of such shortcomings and has even secretly built their ships in such a way that radioactivity can be vented from the ship and its containers to the local environment in case of an accident. In fact, the shipping company that carries nuclear spent fuel through the Caribbean has suggested that despite all precautions, venting of radioactivity will take place at least once every 15 years per ship. This means that one of Pacific Nuclear Transport's five ships could dump radioactivity into the marine environment every 3 years! This catastrophe is not even considered an accident but is regarded as a fact, a given result of ongoing operations.

70. A number of additional nuclear transports through the Caribbean and Panama Canal are scheduled to take place starting in the next few years. While nuclear spent fuel from Japan has transitted the Caribbean on its way to the UK and France since 1968, both high level nuclear waste and plutonium will be returned back through the Caribbean on its return from Europe to Japan as part of these same nuclear reprocessing contracts.

71. Plutonium, extracted from Japanese spent fuel, is scheduled for transport from Europe to Japan via the Caribbean beginning as early as 1992/93. Plutonium is an extremely toxic element: a single microgram quantity of plutonium (smaller than a grain of sand) if inhaled into the human lung is sufficient to induce lung cancer. The dispersion of this material in an accident would be a disaster. At the same time, plutonium is the most highly prized fuel for nuclear weapons. As such, these shipments could be of particular interest to countries or organizations wishing to seize plutonium or sabotage the shipments for political or personal reasons.

72. During a thirty year period, Japan is destined to receive between 150,000 and 400,000 kilograms of plutonium. Each shipment through the Caribbean will contain between 50-1,000 kilograms of plutonium. It is worth noting that a simple nuclear bomb can be made with 7 kg of plutonium or less. If shipments were made containing the largest amounts of plutonium per shipment, some 4 to 5 shipments would be required per year for a ten year period.

73. By 1995, high-level nuclear waste is scheduled to be sent from Europe to Japan on board ships which will transit the Caribbean and the Panama Canal. As part of its reprocessing contracts with the U.K. and France, Japan has agreed to receive high level nuclear waste which arises out of this process. This waste, which will be transported in a glasseous form, is twice as radioactive as nuclear spent fuel. A single shipment of this waste could contain material emitting 15 times as much radiation as was vented during the Chernobyl disaster. From 1995 through 2005, some 60 casks containing a total of 1,200 glass rods are scheduled to be transported by sea via the Caribbean and Panama Canal on the return journey to Japan.

74. At the same time, the U.S.A. has signed an agreement with the West German government to ship this same kind of high level nuclear waste to the Federal Republic of Germany. In all, the U.S.A. plans on sending 32 canisters of glassified waste, with a total gross weight of 31,500 lbs, from a nuclear weapons production facility in Washington state. According to U.S. officials, the shipments could leave the U.S.A. as early as 1991. These shipments are most likely to be shipped from a port or ports on the West Coast of the U.S.A. If this were the case, these nuclear waste shipments would go through the Panama Canal.

75. Return shipments of HEU spent fuel have been returned to the U.S.A. since the late 1960s--sometimes through the Caribbean and Panama Canal. As of 1 January 1989, the U.S.A. has had a self-imposed moratorium on these return shipments due to public concern and protest over the potential danger of the transports. The U.S. government is conducting an environmental assessment of these shipments after which it hopes to resume its receipt of the HEU spent fuel. Accordingly, shipments of this dangerous material could resume during 1991. As of 1984, the U.S.A. had exported about 16,700 kg of HEU to other countries and had received only some 1,500 kg of HEU spent fuel in return.

76. Concern about the catastrophic cost of nuclear transport accidents has spurred protests around the world and has in fact lead to the closure of a number of major ports to such cargoes. Greenpeace urges the Contracting Parties to the Cartagena Convention to seriously consider closing the Wider Caribbean Region to shipments of high-level nuclear material.